On the Interpretation of Phonological Primes by Drachman, Gaberell
On the Interpretation of Phonological Primes1 
Gaberell Drachman 
1. Introduction. 
The core of an empirical science may be said to consist in the 
quest for two kinds of principle, The first, that of prediction 
(Hempel 1953),2 is clearly insufficient in itself, as witness the 
ability of the Babylonians to predict the eclipse of the moon, but 
apparently without the support of any serious speculation on the 
nature of eclipses (Cf. Toulmin 1961; Hanson 1971). The second, 
that of explanation, surely includes the first (contra Hempel-
Oppenheim 1948; cf. Scheffler 1957),3 since explanation mey normally 
allow prediction while the reverse is not necessarily true. 
1.1. To gain precision, scope, and a high possibility of 
confirmation, sciences are codified as systems of concepts. But 
the requirement for empirical content implies a connection between 
these concepts and the world of experience. At least three kinds 
of connectivity have been postulated, 
In the first (call tt strong empiricism, even positivism), 
concepts are defined solely in terms of an observational 
vocabulary, whether sensory or instrumental.. But in such an 
analysis, what would be the status of such a concept as latent learning, 
or any other predisposition to behavior, whether human or in the world 
of physics? Does magnetism disappear in the absence of an attractable 
object, or are the tendencies of the vocal tract absent when we are 
not in the act of speech? 
1.2. The second kind of connectivity (call it liberalized empiricism) 
handles concepts--especially these troublesome disposition terms--
in terms of reduction sentences~ some of which prove to contain 
empirical laws and are thus immediately verifiable by experiment. 
Thus, a reductionist analysis of the disposition term 'assimilation' 
in phonology might contain the sentence "If a speech organ A is to 
be in a position Y, then it will move towards that position even while 
it is still taking up its prior position X", where ·A, X and Y are 
clearly definable in terms of bulk, inertia, etc., for the organ 
concerned, 
1,3, But there are also sets of concepts (such as mass, energy) 
the preferred treatment of which presupposes yet a third aim for 
science, viz., the construction of systems of nomological relations 
quite abstracted from even casual explanation {Cf. Scheffler, 1957)~ 
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as a man is neutral so far as particular routes are concerned 
(Toulmi~ 1953), In such a view, the primes of a science are best 
handled within formal systems, i.e., as uninterpreted concept systems, 
accompanied by appropriate sets of postulates (definitions and 
assumptions). Such systems, if one requires of them only inner 
consistency, and no assertion be made about the properties and 
relations of objects in the external world, have been termed 
'Euclidean' (Boltzmann 1905), where the requirement of internal 
consistency corresponds to Herz' (1899) criterion of 'logical 
permissibility'. 
But in fact the 1over-kill 1 power and hazardous temptations 
available within such purely formal systems are by most scientists at 
least tempered by the precuation of considering the (empirically) 
desired interpretation at the point of choosing the primes them-
selves; and indeed sucq a version of the formal system approach seems 
to underlie the analysis of the phonology of English in Chomsky and 
Halle (1968). That the power of the 'system' has, despite the 
precaution mentioned, not been sufficiently checked, will appear. 
1.4. If the interpretation of a prime involves assigning to it 
some empirical content, this may clearly be done in any of at least 
three ways. We may interpret primes directly, as in a positivistic 
science. We may, as in biology, give content to primes indirectly 
by interpretation of a defined term such as 'cell fusion'. Or we 
may, alternatively, validify our primes by appeal to the h.ypotheses 
forming part of our Postulates: in this case, what are at length 
tested are the deductions we make from our hypotheses or assumptions. 4 
2, Phonology as a scientific theory. 
It is illuminating to consider the advantages and limitations of 
constructing phonology in terms of such a formal theory of primes 
and postulates. I shall here take 'The Sound Pattern of English' 
(hereafter SPE) as a representative case in point, and examine some 
of its primes and assumptions. 
2.1. The primes of the system here are entities such as Distinctive 
Feature, Boundary, Rule of Phonology, etc. The postulates include 
definitions; such are the definitions of segment, formative, 
derivation, etc. . They also include assumptions, of which the 
following are examples: (1) that the sets of Distinctive Features 
(DFs), Boundaries, Formatives, etc. , are finite, (2) that the inputs 
to the phonological rules are syntactically-motivated and labelled 
surface-strings of (underlyingly-shaped) formatives and abstract 
formatives, plus boundary markers, (3) that phonolor,ical rules m~y 
modify, permute, delete, or add see;rnents of formative representations, 
(4) that rules of phonology are (if ordered) linearly applied, and 
cannot re-apply to their own output in the same applicational cycle, 
(5) that all the phonological rules have equal status and are 
equally well motivated, and (G) that all phonological rules represent 
competence (i.e., knowledge, or relations, rather than behavior), 
but that fast speech, coarticulations, etc., are matters of per~ormance. 
2. 2. The interpretation of primes i.s in SPE carried out in terms 
of performance requirements. Two sample problems may be raised 
here. First, systemic considerations in fact interrupt th~ flow-
chart by which one predicts real-time outputs. Thus, adjustment of 
torma.tives (e.g., 'sing+ past'+ s*ng, and 'mend+ past'+ mend+d) 
must of course precede the assigrunent of pluses or minuses for the 
individual DFs within segments. But this assignment constitutes the 
use of DFs in their systemic or classificatory (i.e., uninterpreted) 
function, which thus follows a performance requirement {the so-called 
'adjustment' of formatives), 
Second, it is difficult to decide in principle, when 'interpre-
tation' involves integers on DFs, an~ when further DFs are in fact 
required, A growing range of processes. and interactions between 
processes, has been described. It is even seen that processes may 
appear to be self-contradictory, with a given environment apparently 
provoking opposite effects in different languages, or even different 
periods of the same language. For example, the vowels in the 
neighborhood of nasals are sometimes raises, sometimes lowered; 
similarly, where /h/ is usually (i.e., most frequently attested as) 
a vowel-lowerer, there are cases (e.g., in Classical Greek, see 
Malikouti-Drachman 1972) where it seems to behave as a vowel-raiser. 
Now while the explanations for such apparent contradictions are 
perhaps all to be sought in considerations of physiology and 
perception, it is puzzling whether the details of the explanations, 
whenever these come to light, need in fact to be built directly into 
the rules themselves, viz., as additional DFs. Pace Vennema.nn's 
(1971) explication of back-vowel lowering by coronals as relating to 
the backwards-slope of the body of the tongue, ia a DF 'tongue-slope' 
to be added? Similarly, what DFs would correspond to the putative 
explanation for the Greek case above, that /h/ here probably partly 
unvoices the preceding vowel, with consequent (perceptual-based) 
raising? 
What is not clear is whether, as the full possibilities of the 
vocal tract are disclosed and many further processes are isolated, 
the number of DF(s) required to state all processes in langtl.age will 
remain usefully finite. By way of providing for this eventuality 
in advance, one ought perhaps to consider the possibility of 
abandoning the requirement that the rule-format should itself contain 
the explanation. Without this requirement, the rules themselves 
could·be stripped of all 'understood' detail, although {as well be 
suggested below, Sections 3, 5) an important distinction is r~quired 
in the wa:y in which different rules are to be handled in this respect, 
as well as an important enrichment of the metatheory of phonetics. 
3~ On the equality of Erocesses. 
One of the most important assumptions made in SPE is that all 
the rules postulated are of equal status a.nd are similarly motivated. 
From this assumption hangs the notion, too, that the phonological 
component of a grammar constitutes a seamless web of rules; and it 
follows that linguistic significance is denied to any level between 
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lexical (phonological) and phonetic (uninterpreted DF) repre-
sentations. The fundamental assumption, however, is not 
unchallengeable, as I shall here attempt to show. 
3.1. In SPE, the interpretation of DFs consists of assigning an 
integer to each plus sign, with the implication that the values to 
be assigned are in fact mutually independent from segment to segment. 
But there is some reason to believe that an important generalization 
is missed by this assumption; a generalization captured by the 
classical notion Basis of Articulation (hereafter, the Basis), In 
explicating the role of the Basis in phonology, I have claimed 
(Drachman 1973} that there are ·elements in the lanGUage specific 
tract stance which in fact guarantee or exclude whole sets of 
processes, the Basis thus constitutinr, a kind of casual principle, 
In this sense, the notion of the Basis is grounded in a very general 
principle in biology, which asserts that motor-systems may be 
pre-primed for specific activities, an interpretation which allows 
for innate (Le,, universal) as well as learned (i.e., language-
specific) elements to obtain in speech-priming. 
Thus there prove to be global priming elements that are probably 
genetic in origin, such as the re-organization of the breathing 
program, as well as the fact that the members of the speech-tract 
are pre-set at all. But there are also language-specific elements, 
such as the shaping and attitude of the tongue,5 height of the larynx, 
height and inner tension of the velum, as well as dependency elements 
such as the freedom of the lips to coarticulate with a following 
vowel, etc. That a single element of the Basis may guarantee both 
positive and negative outputs (sponsorinr, as well as blocking 
processes) may be briefly illustrated from the remarks of Dela.ttre 
(1953) on French, an example of which is his 'mode anterieure 1 • 
Delattre's 'mode anterieure' may be looked upon as the 
articulatory implementation of a single acoustical aim, the dominance 
of 'forward resonance', To this end, the tract attitude includes a 
convexed, downward-pointing forward-drawn tongue, with dominated 
(i.e., freely conrticulating) lip-roundinP,, A number of fine phonetic 
facts follow from this global tongue-lips stance. These include 
diverse positive factors (sponsored rules) governing the true 
dentality of dentals--before front vowels, the tip of the tonr,ue 
is actually behind the lower incisors--the dorsal character of /r/, 
and the proneness of vowels to nasalization. However, the very same 
tongue stance also guarantees neeative factors (blocked rules) such 
as that dental obstruents never palatalize in French, even in the 
most casual speech, 
Go far as English is concerned, the Basis probably applies for 
the rule series at lea.st includini:; and following palatalization--as 
confirmed by the productivity of the latter in external sandhi; 
and conversely, the rules precedinF, this series must be represented 
at some hi~her level in the control system, or simply as non-real-
time rules. 
3.2. Faced with such considerations, the argument appears to have 
swung back to the claim at first challenged, viz., that there is 
a natural break in the continuity of the SPE rule system. Hovever, 
not oniy is the place of the break not the same as in the SPE cl~im, 
but it is also quite differently motivated. In particular, it is 
likely that a development of the theory of the Basis will support 
the notion that (Cf. Zwicky 1972b) there is a continuum of processes 
beyond (i.e., later than) those in SPE, processes explicating the 
facts of fast (or, casual) speech. Such a development involves 
consideration of how the Basis is itself adjusted to sponsor various 
degrees of casualness, so that rules are phased in or out in accordance 
with natural hierarchies. 
It is important to note, finally, that the use of the term 
'guarantee' in connection with the operation of the Basis must be 
refined. For it is not the case that all that the activation of the 
elements of the Basis is quite automatic: the Basis only.makes the 
operation of the appropriate processes easeful and.natural--provided 
they are to be allowed. This is in fact only to re-affirm the very 
reasonable constraint that all language processes operate quite within 
the limits imposed by physiology.6 Thus, it need not surprise us t.o 
find many quite idiosyncratic exceptions to rules (whether by virtue 
of lexical, morphological or even syntactic constraints--cf. Zwicky 
1972b),for any given language, even where these rules seem to concern 
very fine phonetics. 
4. Phonology as a non-continuous structure. 
The hypothesis that the phonological component is in fact a 
two-level one may in turn be tested against derived hypotheses. This 
assay is made partially below, with the aid of three such hypotheses. 
4.1. The first derived hypothesis might be that the 'output' rules 
truly constitute a real-time component of the phonology, in fact an 
integral part of the performance component--although of course 
1performance component' is not to be thought of solely in terms of 
mechanical organs, but rather includes also some of the 'upstream' 
apparatus of the neurophysiological control system. 
The real-time requirement, though ill-understood in fine, may 
be grossly correlated with (1) brain synapse-times, (2) impulse-
velocities in cranial nerves, (3) muscle-contraction times, and 
(4) speech-tract inertial constants. An estimate such as that of 
Reich (1968) may prove to be over..:sanguine, failing as it does to 
take account of factors (3) and (4) above; but notice that this failure 
affects the total number of possible processes per second (and thus 
his figure of 200 processes per syllable) only by cutting back some-
what the number of muscle-contraction type of processes, not the 
number of brain processes. 
In the end, it remains unnecessary to assume (pace Wickelgren 
1969) that some 10~-6 language-specific output segments are 'stored' 
as context-sensitive units: there does seem to be time for these 
to be generated by rules that are fully supported by the Basis. 
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4.2. The present evidence for a divided phonology comes in the 
first place from the Basis, as outlined above. It seems supported 
too by evidence from slips of the tongue and children's secret 
laneuages, as perhaps also from some kinds of data from aphasia. 
But there is also a derived hypothesis for rule-systems, a hypothesis 
which at the same time tests the main hypothesis and acts as a 
touch-stone for the well-formedness of rule systems themselves. 
This second derived hypothesis is that, if the rules of a 
phonology fall into two groups, of upper and lower-brain (hereafter, 
upper and lower) rules,7 then it ought never to be the case (i.e., 
in a particular set of rules) that an 'upper' rule follows, or even 
operates simultaneously with a 'lower' one. An interesting case in 
point is provided by the treatment in Kiparsky (1971) and Koutsoudas 
(1971) of data from certain Swiss German dialects first analyzed 
in Kiparsky (1968), · 
In brief, Kiparsky describes the relation between certain forms 
in the (conservative) Schaffhausen and ( innovat'ive) Kesswill dialects 
as illustrating a putative universal of linguistic change, viz., that 
the innovating dialect minimizes 'bleeding' by adopting 1counter-
bleeding1, here for the pair of rules (here given in the 'conservative' 
bleeding order) 
1. Umlaut, for Plural 
2. Lowering of mid-back vowel before a Coronal 
Notinr, that Umlaut is for German p;enerally an 'upper' rule, it 
is clear that Kiparsky 1 s putative universal of change presents us 
with a counter-case to the derived hypothesis above, viz., that 'upper' 
rules should never follow 'lower' ones. 
It must thus be of interest to consider any re-analysis that 
avoids this conclusion, especially if the analysis shows other 
intrinsically interesting features. A candidate re-analysis is thus 
that of Koutsoudas, who holds that in fact the extrinsic ordering 
illustrated ~n Kiparsky's analysis of the conservative dialect is 
unnecessary. o 'l'he proffered alternative analysis assumes that for 
both dialects simultaneous ordering is possible, with the addition of 
a context-free condition (for the conservative dialect) that front 
rounded vowels cannot remain low.9 
:/ow from the point of view of the metatheoretical constraint 
proposed on the ordering of I upper' and 'lower I rules, this anal:,rsis 
is still not quite satisfactory, in that one each of such rules 
are held to operate simultaneously--while Umlaut is certainly an 
'upper' rule, mid-back-vowel lowering certainly seems a 'lower' one. 
There seems no way out of the dilemma at the moment save to suppose 
that, since both rules cannot be considered 'lower', perhaps they are 
both 'upper'; and it remains w1clear whether the analysis or the 
principle is what is at fault. Certainly, Kiparsk:r hinself r,i ves 
reasons for tempering the absoluteness of his principle of Bleeding-
l)reference: in particular, he cites the need to balance ar,ainst it 
factors such as the possibly opposing princi~le of phonotactic natural-
ness. 
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This case illustrates well the prqblem ot the conqept •purpose' 
in scientific analysis. Whereas ethologist, have in many cases 
established putative 'motivation' for certain innate :functions in 
nature (e.g., the coloration of butterfly vings, the complex 
'dance• ot the triple-spined stickle-back), we lack adequate criteria 
that will enable us to extend the principle to linguistics without 
hazard. On the one hand, the causal principle suggested for the Ba.sis 
seems a genuine example of a substantive analogy (in the sense of 
Hesse 1966); it suggests exactly what mechanism is at play in an 
experimentally verifiable situation. On the other, the principle 
of 'purpose' in language-change lacks this kind of verifiability and 
involves the delicate weighing of contradictory forces.10 
4,3. A third derived hypothesis· for a two-level theory of phonology 
concerns the theory of learning; there ought to be correlates at the 
level of neurological. mechanisms, to the distinction between 'lover' 
and 'upper' rule and the way in which they are respectively 'acquired' 
by the child. 
According to Piaget (1926, and passim), the child develops by 
the two complementary processes of assimilation and accommodation: 
new data a.re first assimilated to existing schemata, but these same 
schemata are later accommodated under the pressure of fresh data.
In applying such notions to the data for the acquisition of phonology, 
one must first enquire, how the very first schemata themselves are 
acquired by the growing child. 
The strongest hypothesis concerning the earliest schemata is 
that these are in fact innate, a hypothesis first proposed for 
phonology by Strunpe (1969). On that basis (compare the debate in 
Dracbman 1972a) some further assumptions one might make are: (1) that 
the child brings as 1given' a whole train of 1live 1 processes--
corresponding to the natural predispositions of the human vocal 
tract, (2) that these processes in effect 'funnel' the diversity of 
inputs into a narrow range of possible outputs, perhaps by lateral 
motor inhibition (Cf. Bekesy 1967, on sensory inhibition), (3) that 
for a given formative, only the. 'final' outcome of the process-train 
is a suitable input to the craniai-nerve command-system for moving 
the members of the vocal tract, and (4) that each individual process 
'hunts' across a given formative before giving place to the following 
process. 
-Thus, for the acquisition model, the incoming data may certainly 
be seen as assimilating to existing schemata (here, innate), as is 
clear from the poverty-stricken output of the child for the earliest 
language stages. And it is equally clear that the innate schemata 
are themselves slowly accommodated to the pressure of the data. 
The child makes strong and creative efforts (Cf. Drachman 1971, 1972b) 
to undo the homonymy created by the inevitable operation of the 
funneling processes, and match his output to the input. Later, the 
relations he discovers between stylistic variants (casual, super-
correct, etc.), and in paradigm alternations, etc., are slowly 
subsumed under ever more abstract representations, with correspondingly 
longer sets of rules for the derivation of complementary outputs. 
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There are thus at least three kinds of learning (accommodation) 
to be accounted for, viz., (1) that tract-command improves, so that 
the funnelling effects of natural (inhibition?) processes is slowly 
overcome (de-inhibition?), (2) that processes, or even trains of 
processes, may be tagged with information pertaining to morphology 
or synta.x--a tagging that may also apply to individual lexical items 
viz-a-viz processes~ and (3) that representations may become more 
abstract, so that processes must apparently be added to trains: 
depending on the degree of abstraction of the re-modelled representation, 
these may be 'lower' processes, re-activated--as in the case of the 
very early limited abstractization of surface phonetics (cf. Stampe 
1968); or they may be 'upper' processes, if the child indeed takes 
advantage of every regularity in the data to 'solve' paradigm 
alternations such as Umlaut pluralization. 
Whitaker (1971a) first sugr,ested a possible connection between 
the learning abilities of the child, and the distinction made by 
biophysicist Jakobson (1969) between specific and non-specific 
neuronal connections in the brain. On the basis of research performed 
largely on fish and amphibian eyes, Jakobson supposed the 'wiring• 
of the brain to proceed in two major stages, For innate behavior 
(that not requiring environmental triggering) the basic wiring 
contains invariant connections. But for learned behavior (that 
requiring environmental triggering), he postulated the mediation of 
connections between unconstrained (non-specific) neurons, i.e.~ 
neurons requiring functional validification. 
In terms of the assumption concerning 'lover' processes, we 
might assume that the fundamental train of these processes is laid 
down in terms of specific (invariant) neuronal connections, to be 
triggered (perhaps by a hormone) at some internally-predetennined 
point in time. For the learned (or> 'upper') processes, ~Thitaker 
has, reasonably, implicated the non-specific (unconstrained) neurons; 
these, he says, are activated at about 1 year, and constitute "the 
basis for native language habits". 
Two problems immediately arise, First, it must be explained 
how, if innate processes depend upon invariant connections, they 
can be suppressed or even modified at all. The solution to this 
apparent paradox lies in viewing processes as a function not of 
individual connections but rather of networks of such connections. 
Network-internal excitability is what is indeed modifiable: it may 
be modified directly, by the intervention of selective-action 
hormones on particular neurons; or indirectly, throuRh changes induced 
at synapses or neuron connections (Jakobson 1967), 
The second problem is, why, if they are mediated by non-specific 
or modifiable neurons, do •upper' processes cease to be modifiable 
as soon as they are learned? In the end, the functional analof'Y with 
the eyes of fish and amphibia may prove to be unproductive--for it 
is almost the case that we should prefer to have the system develop 
in the opposite direction, with the modifiable neurons corresponding 
to the modifiable processes and the unmodifiable ones corresponding 
to the obligatory ('upper') rules, 
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5. Uninterpreted and interpreted primes. 
If ve assert that primes ought perhaps to partake in the 
system as uninterpreted elements, ve restore the full power 
available to system-emphasizing analyses, This seems to be both 
the strength and the weakness in the analysis in SPE, where DFs 
have their ill-defined classificatory function 'Within the phono-
logical component, but are given their well-defined phonetic 
(interpretive) function at the interface with the performance· 
component. This paper has attempted to modify this position to the 
extent of asserting that the interpretation must in fact come earlier, 
since some rule.s (those co-opted, by the Basis of Articulation} 
clearly operate in real time, and thus constitute a pa.rt of the 
real-time or performance component, 
On the one hand, some cases of the SPE use of devices such as 
bracketing will automatically be avoided. For example, the single 
(bracketed) rule for vowel rensingll is in the present framework 
clearly two separate rules. The first is 'upper' and applies to 
Lax vowels preceding vowels, as in 'various: variety 1--where the rule 
is obviously ordered before the Vowel Shift. But the second, 
applying to Lax vowels word-finally, as in 'hindu', is clearly 
1lower'--as witness the treatment of French words with final Lax 
vowels, e.g., Englishized 'coupe'. 
On the other hand, rules understood as 'upper' in the prsent 
framework are st~ll vulnerable to such 'over-kill' devices as the 
alpha-convention~-for example, as applied in the rules for the Vowel 
Shift in SPE.12 
One solution to the problem of the over-power in the formal 
analysis might at first sight be to impose the interpretation require-
ment on all the rules (and rule schemata}, for the whole phonological 
component homogeneously. But this carries with it the quite 
unwarranted implication that the 'upper' rules are in fact all 
properly motivated in a synchronic phonology, This is a proposition 
difficult to reconcile with what has been held concerning the 
function of the Basis; for it implies that, as changes in the Basis 
are historically to be associated with (even sometimes to be held 
responsible for) sound changes, the synchronic phonology must necessarily 
recapitulate all such changes in the Basis to ensure that the rules 
operate in plausible fashion. In the extreme case, each rule might 
require its own individual statement concerning the Basis, a state-
ment to be modified for the following rule, etc, 
In the end, since this' last can hardly be a plausible synchronic 
solution, we are again left with uninterpreted primes so far as the 
'upper' rules are concerned; and constraints on the abuse of the 
excessive power of rule schemata thus unavoidably re-introduced must 
be sought elsewhere--perhaps psycholinp;uistic experiments on young 
children might elucidate which schemata are reasonably operative 
during acquisition, as might also childhood aphasia and psychosis 
studies, · 
On the other hand, the rule-schemata for at least the 'lower' 
rules can be radically simplified without loss of plausibility. If 
the explanations are relegated to the metatheory, as suggested above 
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(section 2}, the application or non-application of whole constella-
tions of rules can be predicted from consideration of the Basis 
for the language concerned, as plausible or implausible: it will 
remain to state whether or not the language in fact allows these 
rules to operate Wliversally or whether idiosyncratic constraints 
are to obtain. 
6. Summarx a.nd Conclusions. 
1. Three views of scientific theory are outlined, from the 
point of view of the way in which they hand.le the interpretation 
of primes; strong empiriciam, liberalized empiricism or reductionism, 
and the use of formal systems of uninterpreted primes. 
2. 'fhe· third of these is illustrated vith a particularly well-
developed example, that of SPE. But some of the assumptions 
constituting part of the postulates accompanying these primes are 
examined, on the grounds that such testing is necessary if the 
primes themselves are to be validated. 
3 .. Especially challenged is the assumption that the phonological 
component of a gra.mmar is a seamless web of equally well motivated 
rules, and that these may be followed by the Interpretation as 
part of the description of Performance. It is sugf>ested instead that 
the real-time interpretation of DFs must obtain at latest before the 
end of the SPr; system, and in particular from the point at which the 
Basis of Articulation guarantees the low-level outputs sanctioned 
in the language concerned. 
4. 1hree subsidiary hypotheses derived ~rom the assumption of 
a two-part phonology are then examined: (1) the time-requirement, 
which makes quite feasible a real-time phonology, at least for the 
1lower 1 rules, (2) the implications for phonological chanr;e, one of 
which is the constraint that innovation our,ht never to re-order an 
'upper' rule to follow a 'lower' one, and {3) speculations from 
neurology, which perhaps support the cognitive (pia.getian} model 
for the acquisition of such a phonology. 
5, Finally, since it seems unreasonable to require interpret-
ability over the whole rule-system, the problem is considered, how 
to constrain the over-powerful devices apparently allowable within 
the formal (i. e, , uninterpreted) part of the phonoloBY. It will 
hopefully prove possible to apply psycholinF,Uistic t~sts to determine 
the reasonableness of particular putative rule-schemata. 
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Footnotes 
1. This pa.per will appear in the Proceedings, VII Linguistisches 
Kolloquium. (Nijmegen) 1972. 
2. Except where otherwise indicated, the framework ot the 
argument ot Section l is essentially a paraphrase of Hempel (1953). 
3, The temporal asymmetry between explanation and prediction 
discussed in Scheffler (1957} suggests that explanation is the more 
significant. But Scheffler's argument is really that neither prediction 
nor explanation plays a central role in science. 
4. Note that the interpretation will still unavoidably contain 
disposition terms. This caveat, so far as phonology is concerned, 
corresponds to the notion.that rules describe not inevitabilities 
but predispositions to processes--a notion to be considered in 
Section 3.2. Of such predispositions, the notion 'degree of probability 
of behavior' must correlate with what is understood of hierarchies 
of environment (Cf. Zwicky 1972b).
5. Shaping refers to the concave/convex/flat displacement of 
the tongue; attitude, to its vertical and/or horizontal displacement. 
6. A claim difficult to substantiate in that it is not clear 
how to define fastest, or most casual, speech (Zwicky 1972a); defined 
in terms of the speaker's intention to communicate (Cr. Dressler 
1972), even blurted speech must be included. And even blurted speech 
is, in appropriate circumstances, comprehensible to an involved 
hearer. 
On the other hand, experiments in Kozhevnikov and Chistovich 
(1965) suggest that the degradation of fast speech forms is not the 
result simply of moving the articuJ.ators more quickly: rather, it 
seems that normal speech targets are not reached, since the articulators 
actually move more slowly. But this is to say that there are in fact 
(separate) intended targets appropriate to casual speech. This is 
a conclusion supported by the (mentalistic degree of stress) 
constraint on vowel-reduction for forms like deportation and relax-
ation, as against the corresponding forms like d;m.9.nstration, -
devastation (SPE); and the (even nearer to the output) constraints 
on -;;-a-articulation, say, for Russian (Ohman 1966). 
7, Cf., from aphasia studies, Whitaker's {1971b) 'central' vs. 
'peripheral' rules. Also Cf. Stampe•s parallel distinction 'dead' 
vs. 'live' (Seminar, Winter 1972 at Ohio State University) rules. 
8. Koutsoudas is concerned with the general problem of extrinsic 
ordering in linguistic analysis. The evidence from child-development 
has been tentatively remarked upon (Dracbman 1972a) briefly, it seems 
that phenomena resembling extrinsic {i.e., non-feeding) ordering of 
processes may arise as artifacts of the language acquisition process. 
Note also that one case not discussed in Koutsoudas, that of 
optional mutual bleeding, creates a special problem. In the pair 
of utterances (e.g.) [fa h!mJ - [far !mJ, 1for him', r-loss a.nd 
h-loss are mutually bleeding. But it is probably the case that, even 
in R,P., the first version is more formal than the second; thus we 
must mark the orders for style, since the more casual form is not 
derived, as is normally the case, from the more formal one. 
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9, The apparent re-ordering in the innovating dialect 
consists, in this framework, simply in the removal of the constraint 
on height for front rounded vowels, 
10, A parallel coll~sion of criteria is exemplified in language 
acquisition. On the one hand; the child's motivation can reasonably 
be assumed to be to reproduce as much information as possible. On 
the other, the principle 'do what is easiest' dominates at least 
the early stages, with resultant truncated syntax and degraded 
formative-shapes, When, later, the two principles collide, the 
former is (at least sporadically) the stronger, as witness the 
various strategies including (e.g.) the 'use' of long-distance 
assimilation processes (Drachman 1972b), 
11. Mccawley (1972) first pointed to the illegitimate use of 
bracketing in this case, on the grounds that it implied an ordering 
constraint on one part of a rule, which in fact applied only to the 
other part. 
12. Many re-interpretations have been attempted, as a result 
of widespread dissatisfaction with the use of the alpha-convention 
in this case. The latest of these is perhaps Stampe 1s (1972). 
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